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THE CULPABILITY OF ACCOUNTING PRACTICE IN PROMOTING 
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
ABSTRACT 
Bribery and corruption are increasing in the developing countries. It has been estimated 
that some $400 billion of bribe is paid to political elite in developing countries. Such 
huge amounts of money cannot be successfully executed without the active involvement 
of multinational companies (MNCs) from the Western countries. This paper examines the 
processes involved in the misapplication of accounting practice from the perspective of 
anti-social criminal practices. It analyses the implication of accounting practice in the 
construction of MNCs bribery and corruption activities. The paper locate MNCs 
enterprise culture and accounting practice within the broader dynamics of global 
capitalism to argue that the drive for higher profit at almost any cost is not constrained by 
accounting rules, laws and even periodic regulatory actions. The paper uses publicly 
available evidence to illuminate the role of accounting technology in concealing and 
facilitates MNCs corrupt practices in developing countries. Evidence is provided to show 
that to secure and retain business in developing countries and to gain competitive 
advantages MNCs have engaged in bribery and corruption. The paper also makes 
suggestions for reform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Accounting, Bribery, Corruption, Multinational Companies, Developing 
countries, transparency, Accountability  
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THE CULPABILITY OF ACCOUNTING PRACTICE IN PROMOTING 
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Corruption is a recurring feature in media coverage. It comprises a wide range of 
activities, such as bribery, money-laundering, fraud, embezzlement, abuse of power, 
white-collar crime, identity theft, conflict of interest and many more practices (see 
Otusanya, 2010). In common with many other socially constructed practices corruption 
may be difficult to define precisely, but its effects are all too visible (Sikka, 2008). In 
general, bribery and corruption involve attempts to gain unfair advantage (Shazson, 
2007).  Corruption undermines the rule of law, stifles economic growth, and denies many 
their rightful share of economic resources. Corruption is therefore a major obstacle to 
economic and social development (Otusanya, 2011a). A comprehensive analysis of such 
matters is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, it explores some aspects of the supply 
side of corruption in a developing country and the implication of accounting. 
 
The prevalence of corruption in developing countries has attracted a great deal of 
attention in the literature. Most existing studies focus on the demand side of the 
corruption, that is, on the corrupt official who receive bribes (see Rose-Ackerman, 1978; 
Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991; Zakiuddin and Haque, 2002; Olurode, 2005; AAPPG, 
2006), a number of other scholars and reports have argued that bribe money often stems 
from MNCs based in the world’s richest countries (Briloff, 1981; AAPPG, 2006; 
Christian Aid, 2006; Transparent International, 2009; Sikka, 2008; Otusanya, 2010; 
2011c). There has been an explosion of media headings reporting investigations, 
prosecutions and settlements of bribery and corruption violations involving MNCs and 
their executives, directors and employees (Briloff, 1981; Vanasco, 1999). Thus 
developing countries cannot therefore be accused of being corrupt without the connection 
of corrupters – ‘supply side’ (Varese, 2000, AAPPG, 2006; Annual Integrity Report, 
2005-2006; Sikka, 2008; Otusanya, 2010, 2011a). Therefore, corruption is not a marginal 
issue but central concern for business – in developing, emerging and industrialised 
countries alike (Transparency International, 2009).  
 
Accounting calculus and ideologies have become a major influence on commercial and 
everyday life (Mitchell et al., 1998; Neu et al., 2010). Based on a body of rules or 
national and international standards, accounting is built on a formalistic framework 
whose aim should be to provide relevant, unbiased information (Compin, 2008). It has 
been argued that accounting has developed as a means of recording transactions and 
identifying, and thereby inhibiting, fraudulent activity (Mitchell et al., 1998; Compin, 
2008). The expansion of MNCs activities has been aided by accounting technologies that 
emphasise private property rights and appropriation of economic surpluses (Johnson 
1972; Briloff, 1981; Tinker, 1985).  
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Accounting technologies lubricate the wheels of capitalism through a variety of schemes 
to enable capital to advance its interests. Although corporations are created through law 
and numerous social contracts, in their search for higher profits and financial gains, 
MNCs do not owe allegiance to any one particular nation, community or locality (Bakan, 
2004). The mobility of MNCs is shaped by changes in contemporary capitalism where 
corporate performance and values are driven by higher earnings. Under pressure to 
compete with other companies and to increase profits, capitalist enterprises, including 
MNCs, constantly search for new ways of increasing their profits, and one way in which 
they do so is by developing complex financial structures in order to conceal their bribe 
payment and corrupt practices (Briloff, 1981; Compin, 2008). Auditing and internal 
control systems seek to foster trust and encourage the belief that companies are 
transparent and their directors are accountable (Sikka, 2008). Yet, accounting provides 
sophisticated support to the criminal approach and serves as a risk minimisation tool 
(Briloff, 1981; Tinker, 1985; Compin, 2008).  
  
 A number of studies have examined the role of accounting and accountants in relation to 
the social, economic and political involvement of MNCs in anti-social financial practices 
(Briloff, 1976, 1981; Tinker, 1985; Mitchell et al., 1998; Sikka, 2008; Owolabi, 2011). 
Studies examining the role of accountancy firms and professionals in money laundering 
(Mitchell et al., 1998; Sikka, 2008; Otusanya, 2012), bribery and corruption (Sikka, 
2008; Bakre, 2008; Otusanya, 2010; 2011b), the way accounting is used in money 
laundering and money dirtying (Compin, 2008) allude to and indirectly illustrate the use 
of accounting practice within organisations. But comparatively little research has 
addressed the use of accounting practice in anti-social and predatory acts of MNCs and 
their affiliates in developing countries (Otusanya, 2010; 2011abd).  
 
Accounting is expected to expose financial irregularities in company accounts by 
enhancing transparency and accountability and by developing techniques for fraud 
detection. However, an emerging body of literature argues that accounting have 
increasingly been used to conceal and promote anti-social practices (Briloff, 1976, 1981; 
Tinker, 1985; Sikka, 2008; US Senate Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations, 
2005; Bakre 2007, 2011).  Positioning accounting as a determinant element of financial 
criminal practices presupposes an epistemological examination of accounting knowledge. 
As well as being a technique, accountancy can also be a language, an act and a science 
(Compin, 2008). Compin (2008) further argued that ‘no matter how it is qualified, 
accounting knowledge can be used to aid and abet financial crime. As a technique, 
accountancy adds a sophisticated edged to criminal operations’ (p. 592). 
 
In this paper we adopt such an alternative standpoint, to illuminating the role accounting 
played in cases of bribery and corruption by MNCs. This is because corruption thrives 
when accountability and transparency are absent (Johnson, 2005). The paper provides 
evidence to show the involvement of multinational companies through the use of 
accounting to facilitate their bribery and corrupt practices which are carried out in order 
to gain competitive advantages, increased profits and high return to capital but which 
cause harm to individuals (see Briloff, 1976, 1981; Tinker, 1985; Otusanya, 2010). Such 
‘darker’ practices are located within the broader dynamics of global capitalism where 
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corporations use a variety of schemes to gain competitive advantages and to increase 
profits. 
 
The paper contains five further sections. Section 2 adopts the theoretical framework of 
global capitalism and the role of accounting in order to help understand how a corporate 
drive for increased profits and competitive advantage may persuade MNCs to engage in 
anti-social practices. Section 3 examines the existing literature on corrupt practices and 
the various cases that have been used to explore the phenomenon of corrupt practices by 
MNCs in developing countries. Section 4 reviews the anti-corruption regime in the US 
and the need for efficient and adequate internal control systems to prevent illegal act such 
as bribery of foreign officials and government to secure or maintain contract overseas. 
Section 5 provides evidence to show that, despite laws, regulations and internal control 
systems, MNCs continue to engage in bribery, corruption and money-laundering and 
these practices are facilitated by the use of accounting to conceal them. The final section, 
Section 6, discusses the significance of corruption and its implications for development in 
developing countries. 
 
2. Unaccountable Accounting 
The preparation of financial statement (accounting) and auditing both the statements and 
accounts from which they are prepared are means of achieving accountability in society 
(Tinker, 1985). Accounting systems and the information that they presents are used to 
control a diverse range of institutional activities, including payment of tax obligations, 
control of cost in government contract. Obviously, accounting practices has been shaped 
by many forces other than for economic thinking. But marginalism has monopolised 
accounting thought in one specific sense (Tinker, 1985).  Briloff (1972) argued that, ‘one 
might then expect the implementation of procedures for assuring the corporation and its 
management the highest degree of visibility and accountability—so that all who are 
entitled to know will know, and thereby be able to make rational decisions. This 
expectation notwithstanding the situation, is very much otherwise’ (p. 6). Accounting 
information facilitates the valuation of what is – or what might be – received through a 
configuration of exchange transactions. For example, the SEC (on behalf of community) 
gives social legitimacy and support to a corporation in exchange for behaviour that 
conforms to certain laws and norms. In all cases, accounting information helps parties to 
social and economic transactions assess the adequacy of the value of their returns or 
entitlements (Tinker, 1985). 
 
The consistent use of accounting principles and procedures has long been considered 
essential in the evaluation of a firm’s activities and in the projection of future activities 
(Tinker, 1985). While accounting is mostly viewed as a solution, it has also been 
implicated in facilitating corruption and other related financial criminal practices aimed 
at increasing profit/capital accumulation and reducing social obligations. It has been 
argued that anti-social financial practices are a regular occurrence in both developed and 
developing countries; and that accounting practices have played a key role in facilitating 
MNCs’ pursuit of profits and earnings and capital accumulation by the elite (Briloff, 
1981; Tinker, 1985; Bakre, 2007, 2011; Sikka, 2008; Compin, 2008).  Compin (2008) 
noted that:  
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‘The positioning of accounting as a determinant element of financial crime presupposes 
that modern sophist excel at providing deceptive information whilst maintaining a 
semblance of rationality and economic credibility’ (p. 592.)   
  
Paradoxically, bribery and corruption are part of broader business management, and 
however, these areas are colonised by accounting professionals because there are 
accounting numbers which characterised these activities and in turn increase corporate 
profits (Briloff, 1981;  Tinker, 1985). Accounting numbers and information are 
constructed to accommodate different interests within an organisation (Latour, 1993). 
Reporting the ‘facts’ and ‘taking account’ inevitably enhances the interest of some 
groups over others. Hence, bribery and corruption are social and institutional practice 
that relies on accounting and entails accountability. Corruption and accounting therefore 
form an interpenetration of practices. According to Miller (1990):  
‘Accounting is a process of attributing financial values and rationale to wide range of 
social practices, thereby according them a specific visibility, calculability and 
operational utility’ (p. 316-317). 
 
This has been accompanied by a variety of strategies to improve corporate earnings 
through financial engineering, cartel, money laundering, bribery and corrupt practices 
(Briloff, 1981; Tinker, 1985; Sikka, 2008; Bakre 2007, 2011; Otusanya, 2010, 2011a). 
Veblen (1904) argued that those in control of large managerially governed corporations, 
attempted to promote the interest of capital by creating illusions (manipulating output, 
disseminating false reports and information, or withholding positive news) that affect 
exchange prices thereby recognising the power of accounting to affect the distribution of 
income between and within social classes. Social constituency accounting recognisees 
conflicts of interest, both within the corporation and between the corporation and other 
interest group. This therefore illustrates how an executive’s moral concerns and altruistic 
desire must ultimately succumb to her corporation’s overriding goals:  
‘If you’re a CEO’, ‘do you think your shareholders really care whether you’re Billy 
Buttercup or not? Do you think that they would prefer you to be a nice guy over having 
money in their pocket? I don’t think so. I think people want money. That’s the bottom 
line’. Greed and moral indifference define the corporate world’s culture,...As pressure 
builds on CEOs to increase shareholder value, corporations are doing anything and 
everything they can to be competitive’. (Bakan, 2004, p. 55.) 
  
The latter conflicts, or side effects, of corporate behaviour are often called externalities 
which include the usually negative effect of corporate activities on the well-being of 
community members outside the corporation, in situations in which they cannot obtain 
compensation through legal, contractual, or other means (Tinker, 1985). Tinker (1985) 
argued further that conflict over externalities (positive or negative) is merely a further 
example of struggle over distribution of income. Fundamentally, there is little difference 
among a firm that seeks to avoid the cost of safe treatment of toxic waste, a firm that uses 
fictitious financial statements to raise capital, and a firm that successfully disposes of its 
pension obligations to employees. These situations are identical in that they exemplify 
the struggle among different social constituencies over the distribution of income, a 
struggle in which accounting plays an important and substantial part (Tinker, 1985). 
Compin (2008) noted that: 
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‘The fiduciary currency and double entry bookkeeping formerly constituted the twin 
pillars of development of capitalism and helped make it the dominant economic system. 
However, the irrational exuberance of stock markets combined with repeated financial 
scandals have cast a cloud over an economic system..... The weakness of capitalism lies 
in its capacity to pervert both financial statement preparation and auditing, which 
constitutes accounting’. (p. 591.) 
 
Accounting practices are essential in preventing and detecting bribery. Bribery often 
involves financial payment in one form or another, and it inevitably leaves behind a paper 
trail. Accounting is an information system that reports financial transactions and auditing 
serves as the monitoring and internal control mechanism—together they form a critical 
line of defence against corrupt practices. But poor financial information reporting 
systems can greatly undermine the firms’ ability to detect and prevent bribery activities. 
As Briloff (1981) noted: 
‘The Pervasive ‘fakes’ produced in the corporate accountability environment—where the 
unsophisticated public has been led to believe that an effective system of checks and 
balances assures the accountability by the professional managers, the stewards of the 
wondrous pools of resources concentrated in our major publicly owned corporations’. (p. 
1.)  
 
It was further stated that ‘compliance with generally accepted accounting principles is not 
necessarily sufficient for an accountant to discharge his public obligation. Fair 
presentation is the touchstone for determining the adequacy of disclosure and financial 
statements. While adherence to generally accepted accounting principles is a tool to help 
achieve that end, it is not necessarily a guarantee of fairness’ (Briloff, 1981, p. 5). 
Therefore, the underlying principles of ensuring adequate reporting to enhancing good 
investment decisions can only be accomplished, if financial statements fully and fairly 
portray the actual financial condition of the company.  
 
It has been argued that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 19771 (FCPA 1977) was partly 
the result of lack of confidence in the accounting professions concern and ability to 
uncover illegal act of the US corporations abroad (Lehman, 1995). The accounting 
provisions of the FCPA were adopted to strengthen the system of corporate 
accountability. Accounting’s failure to protect third party and the public interest has been 
reflected most recently in the latest global financial crises and bribery and corruption 
investigations. Tinker (1985) noted that accounting practice has helped cover up a 
number of financial scandals by large corporations, and in doing so, has encourage 
financial irresponsibility and mismanagement among multinational corporations.  
 
Accounting and auditing are also essential in detecting bribery activities. Unusual and 
excessive expenditure may immediately raise the red flag on the possibility of bribery, 
and departure from the routine handling of financial transactions could also catch the 
attention of well-trained accountants (Briloff, 1981; Wu, 2005). Accountants are the first 
 
1 The genesis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the United States illustrates the detrimental impact of 
appropriative behaviour at the international level. The mid-1970s witnessed a series of bribery scandals 
involving US-bases multinationals, executives, military personnel, and politician of foreign government 
(Tinker, 1985, p. 196). 
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set of gatekeepers to ensure that transactions are valid, at arms length, captured, and 
properly recorded according to the established standards (see Kimbro, 2003). The 
accounting profession is a major accomplice to this—perhaps biggest of all—
appropriation form the nation states. By failing to challenge the fictitious and fraudulent 
transactions shown in the financial statements of MNCs, auditors and accountants are 
keeping alive the prospect of the bribery and corruption in the corporate world. It has 
been suggested that the various bribery and corrupt practices prosecuted by SEC and DOJ 
in recent times all exposed the distributional impact of accounting, discrediting the 
profession’s image of objectivity and impartiality and under-cutting its authority and 
credibility (Briloff, 1981).  
 
Corruption in private sector (particularly, MNCs) can take place when top management 
decides to bribe government functionaries to get some benefits. In such situation, why 
would they ask their auditor to report on corruption? (Khan, 2006). Managers might 
pursue their own interest at the expense of the owner and other stakeholders of the firm. 
For example, ‘securing a public project by bribing public officials may increase the 
compensation for the managers, but the firm could be held criminally liable for such 
action, and the owners and other stakeholders are forced to take the blame for the 
managers’ actions’ (Wu, 2005, p. 62). There could be situations in large public or private 
sectors organisations and in government department, where the rules and regulations are 
quite foolproof, yet corruption continue to flourish because of poor implementation. The 
auditor can point out these weaknesses as potential sources of corruption. The rules, 
regulations, procedures and operational standards of these organisations often leave 
lacunae, which create opportunities for corruption or at least protect corruption (Khan, 
2006).  Accounting rules, regulations and operational standards are only as good as the 
enforcement mechanism driving them, and the external auditors may align their interests 
with the corrupt corporate boards and managers by turning a blind eye to irregularities in 
accounting reports.  
 
As finance capital has expanded, opportunities have increased for antisocial practices 
such as bribery and corruption (Sikka, 2008, 2010; Otusanya, 2010). As crime and 
criminals have become increasingly sophisticated, so too have their efforts to conceal 
money and assets worldwide, often beyond the reach of law enforcement. These were 
vividly exposed by the various investigations conducted by United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) into the activities of their 
MNCs operating in developing countries. The US SEC’s report noted that: 
‘Bribery and corrupt payment were committed through the use of shell companies, 
secrecy havens, complex corporate structures and back-to-back financial documentation 
between MNCs and their affiliates in developing countries’. 
 
The multiple layers of corporate structure can also be an obstacle to effective internal 
control of company. While the FCPA-induced regulatory framework where aimed at 
constructing a primary web of regulation, the supporting constraints on accounting 
calculations and the behaviour of managers and accountants differed from organisation to 
organisation. Internal control process within an organisation is designed to provide 
reasonable assurance which ensures a reliability and integrity of information and 
compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws, and regulations. But, weak internal 
 9 
controls such as financial management, auditing, and personnel systems are also 
facilitating conditions. Even if the top management is committed to ethical business 
conduct, lower-level managers or employees may engage in corrupt practices to increase 
their short-term personal gain. Many MNCs have established subsidiary companies to 
penetrate market in developing countries, and there have been several high profile bribery 
cases involving these subsidiaries in recent years. This therefore suggests that the 
adoption of rules and regulations in accounting reforms should not be interpreted as equal 
to having good accounting practices. Herlihy and Levine (1976) therefore argue that: 
‘The accountant’s failure to uncover the massive bookkeeping deficiencies that have been 
revealed should lead to a fundamental re-evaluation of the profession’s role in 
preventing these abuses’. (p. 546). 
  
This is because the FCPA 1977 emphasised the role of auditors in the disclosure process 
and stressed that the audit process is the foundation of corporate disclosure. Therefore, 
improvement on audit reliability is likely to increase public confidence in securities 
market (Vanasco, 1999). However, bribery and corrupt practices thrive on secrecy and 
through the use of accounting to conceal their trail (Sikka, 2008; Otusanya, 2010). As 
Briloff (1981) notes: 
‘The body of knowledge which the profession has evolved can lead to a fair 
presentation—most financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP do provide a 
reasonable and responsible basis for decision making. But these very same precepts may 
be perverted and distorted in practice, so that we often paint fakes....’. (p. 8.) 
  
This enterprise culture, which prioritises the commercial acumen of employees rather 
than ethical conduct, or even technical ability, becomes institutionalised, as the individual 
managers (professional) begins to internalise these value systems and norms (Sikka, 
2008; Sikka and Hampton, 2005). These internalised practices and behaviours can be 
used to facilitate the anti-social corrupt practices of MNCs. A number of studies have 
blamed the management for the questionable and improper corporate behaviour and 
suggests measures to establish ethical and moral values in the work place and to prevent 
the recurrence of illicit overseas contracts (Vanasco, 1999; Otusanya, 2011a). The 
establishment and maintenance of system of internal control and accurate books and 
records as required by relevant provisions of FCPA 1977 and Securities and Exchange 
Act are fundamental responsibilities of management. Corporation could and have been 
held liable for corrupt payment made by their employees, even though not explicitly 
authorised (Miller, 1979; Briloff, 1981).   
 
3. Review of Related Cases 
This section examines the literature on the role of accounting in bribery and corrupt 
practices, a role which seems to deviate from their primary role as external watchdogs of 
shareholder wealth and as protectors of the public interest. 
 
Accurate financial information reporting is essential to detect bribery and fraud, creative 
accounting reports have been widespread practices in private sector organisations. While 
it is widely believed that corrupt politicians and government officials are the bribe-takers, 
it is often the private sector (especially the corporate sector) that offers the bribe (Wu, 
2005). Transparency International (2009) noted that:  
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‘The private sector plays a pivotal and expanding role in improving the well-being of 
societies, communities and individuals.... the private sector can also fail on all these 
counts, however. It can enrich a few at the cost of many. It can disenfranchise, destabilise 
society and foster corruption, whether in communities, market, governments or 
international relations, ultimately undermining the prerequisites for its own existence’. 
(p. 3.)   
 
Corruption in the private sector (particularly MNCs), regardless of which form it takes, 
usually involves a financial payments, which inevitably leaving a paper trail behind in 
accounting record (see Wu, 2005). The SEC requirement states that corporations must 
devise and establish an internal control system that ensures that MNCs keep books, 
records, and accounts which accurately reflect the transactions and disposition of the 
issuers’ assets.  
 
It has been argued that market forces through greater competition will lead to less, rather 
than more, corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Ades and di Tella, 1999; World Bank, 
1997). The World Bank (1997) was of the view that improving the functioning of 
markets would lead to a reduction in financial corruption:  
‘Markets will generally discipline participants more effectively than the public sector 
can, and their power to do so is closely linked to sound economic policy. Enlarging the 
scope and improving the functioning of markets will strengthen competitive forces in the 
economy and curtails rents, thereby eliminating the bribes public officials may be offered 
(or may extort) to secure them2’.  
 
In contrast to the above, globalisation and free market ideology has further contributed to 
corruption globally. In the 1970s, several editorials document the extent of illicit 
payments of bribe to foreign government in developing countries. According to Vanasco 
(1999) ‘these scandals of corrupt foreign officials were reported almost daily by the 
press’ (p. 162). For example, in 1975, Wall Street Journal documented a number of cases, 
United Brands Corporation made payments to high foreign official to obtain banana tax 
reduction in Honduras. Ashland Oil Company bribed foreign officials to obtain an oil 
drilling permit in Gabon. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. bribed lower and middle bureaucrats 
in 36 countries. It was disclosed at Senate hearing in 1975-76 that Lockheed had made 
more than $106 million in secret ‘commission’ to promote foreign sales, including $7 
million to a well-connected Japanese agent who was also the head of a right-wing youth 
movement (Tinker, 1985). Exxon Oil Corp. offered kickbacks more than $50 million to 
the Italian political parties and government officials in order to secure a natural gas 
contract and to buy favourable tax and energy legislation (Vanasco, 1999; Tinker, 1985). 
In 1976, the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs’s hearings 
on illicit payments further revealed that several American concerns were engaged in 
bribing foreign officials or political parties to secure contracts abroad: 
‘Northrop Corporation paid foreign agents/consultants inflated fees or commission to 
pay officials in Saudi Arabia, NATO, and the Common Market countries.  Lockheed 
Aircraft Corporation reportedly made payoffs in Germany, Italy, Turkey, Columbia, 
 
2  The World Bank (1997), ‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank’, available 
on-line at http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor05.htm accessed on 23 October 
2006. 
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Nigeria, Greece, South Africa, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Gulf 
Oil Company made illegal Payments in South Korea, and Mobil Oil Corporation made 
illicit payments to Italian government officials’ (Vanasco, 1999, p. 162) 
 
These scandals were reported to have threatened US foreign policy and paved passage of 
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act 1977. Corporations are now required to disclose 
questionable payments, and as a result of such disclosure a number of MNCs are 
implicated. These include Boeing ($500 million), General Tire and Rubber ($41 million), 
Northrop ($34 million), and many others (Tinker, 1985).  
 
In addition, the US Conglomerate Baker Hughes Incorporated pleaded guilty to three 
charges of corruption and was fined $44 million for hiring agents to bribe officials in 
Nigeria, Angola, indonesia, Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. It was reported in these 
cases that companies devised several schemes to make illicit payments to foreign officials 
and political parties which include cash and non cash transactions. The expenses were 
accounted for under a variety of false and financial headings such as publicity and 
promotional expenses, fees paid to agents, consulting agreements advances to the 
corporation’s foreign subsidiaries.   
 
Corruption is a global phenomenon which requires both local and global solutions. A 
number of international initiatives3 have been established to criminalise the bribery of 
public officials (to address the supply side of corruption) and to provide mutual legal 
assistance. The corruption scandals of the 1970s involving illicit payments by US 
multinational companies (MNCs) and foreign politicians led to the passage of the US 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 and this is examined in the following 
section. 
 
4. Anti-Corruption Regime in the United States 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the ‘FCPA’ or the ‘Act’) was enacted in 1977 in the 
wake of a series of overseas and domestic bribery scandals involving 400 major 
corporations. FCPA originally prohibited US corporations and US nationals from making 
improper payments to foreign officials, parties or candidates, in order to assist a company 
in obtaining, retaining or directing business to any person. It also imposed record-keeping 
and internal controls requirements on all companies subject to Securities and Exchange 
Commission (‘SEC’) jurisdiction. The FCPA and its amendment – the Trade and 
Competitive Act of 1988 – are unique not only in the history of accounting and auditing 
profession, but also in international law. As Vanasco (1999) notes: 
‘The Acts raised awareness of the need for efficient and adequate internal control 
systems to prevent illegal acts such as bribery of foreign officials, political parties and 
government to secure or maintain contracts overseas’. (p. 161) 
 
The 1998 amendment expanded the jurisdiction of the US government to prosecute 
foreign companies and nationals who cause, directly or through agents, an act in 
 
3  These includes; Federal Corrupt Practices Act 1977, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 1997; UN 
Convention Against Corruption 2005, World Bank Anti-Corruption Strategies, and the UK Bribery Act 
2010. 
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furtherance of a corrupt payment to take place within the territory of the United States. In 
addition, US parent corporations may also be liable for the acts of foreign subsidiaries 
where they have authorised, directed or controlled the activity of US citizens or residents 
who were employed by or acting on behalf of such foreign incorporated subsidiaries. The 
FCPA contains two types of provisions:  
‘Anti-bribery provisions, which prohibit corrupt payments to foreign officials, parties or 
candidates to assist in obtaining or retaining business or securing any improper 
advantage; and record-keeping and internal controls provisions, which impose certain 
obligations on all companies whose securities are registered in the United States or 
which are required to file reports with the SEC, regardless of whether or not the 
companies have foreign operations’. (Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1977, as amended.) 
  
The Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) has primary responsibility for enforcing the anti-
bribery provisions of the Act while the SEC generally enforces the accounting (books and 
records and internal controls) provisions. Both institutions have authority to seek 
permanent injunctions against present and future violations. In the process of constructing 
the new regulatory web, the accounting and auditing practice was enlisted to provide the 
necessary assurance of fairness in the conduct of MNCs business in developing nations. 
The FCPA’s Books and Records and Internal Control provisions expressly states that:  
‘Books, records and accounts are kept in reasonable detail to accurately and fairly 
reflect transactions and dispositions of assets, and (ii) that a system of internal 
accounting controls is devised (a) to provide reasonable assurances that transactions are 
executed in accordance with management's authorisation; (b) to ensure that assets are 
recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements and to maintain 
accountability for assets; (c) to limit access to assets to management's authorization; and 
(d) to make certain that recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing 
assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any 
differences’. 
  
The importance of this provision can be appreciated when one considers the fact that in 
all jurisdictions companies are specifically required by law to publish their financial 
statements. To stress the importance of audit as part of the regulatory web, all 
corporations (whether local or MNCs) are required to have a sound internal control 
systems in ensuring the truth and fairness of transactions included in the financial 
statements. While the Books and Records and Internal Control provisions technically 
apply only to issuers and not to foreign subsidiaries, the enforcement agencies have hold 
parent companies liable for false or fraudulent entries on any book or record that is 
ultimately consolidated with an issuer’s books and records for financial reporting 
purposes.  
‘Proof of a US territorial nexus is not required for the FCPA to be implicated against US 
companies and citizens, and FCPA violations can, and often do, occur even if the 
prohibited activity takes place entirely outside of the United States For this reason, 
business leaders must be knowledgeable about all business activity, including activity 
that takes place thousands of miles away from corporate headquarters’. 
 
In many instances, improper payments to a foreign official to obtain or retain business 
result not only in anti-bribery charges, but also books and records and internal control 
charges, given that improper payments are often falsely characterised on a company’s 
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books and records as ‘miscellaneous’ expenses, ‘commissions,’ etc. and given the 
enforcement agencies’ view that the improper payments would not have been made if the 
company had effective internal controls. Violations of the books and records and internal 
control provisions can also be charged in isolation even if anti-bribery violations are not 
charged. Vanasco (1999) noted that: 
‘The SEC’s persistence to protect investors and its determination to file civil suits against 
US corporations that do not keep adequate record of their transactions for overseas 
operations or fail to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal control to detect 
and prevent improper payments ought to be of great concern not only to management and 
audit committees but also to internal and external auditors’. (p. 161).  
 
The FCPA has constrained the role of not only of the audit committee but also that of the 
external auditor and internal auditor. In their audits, auditors must pay more attention to 
suspicious entries that might indicate possible questionable payment to foreign agent, 
consultants and foreign officials. Seidel (1980) noted that businessmen must be 
responsible for establishing an accounting control system that will inform them of what 
happens to their assets. The SEC recognised that ‘the size of business, diversity of 
operations, degree of centralisation of financial and operating management, amount of 
contract by top management with day-to-day operations, and numerous other 
circumstances are factors which management must consider in establishing and 
maintaining an internal control system’  
 
The FCPA also requires ‘issuers’ (any company including foreign companies) with 
securities traded on a US exchange or otherwise required to file periodic reports with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) to keep books and records that accurately 
reflect business transactions and to maintain effective internal controls (the “Books and 
Records and Internal Control Provisions). The accounting provision of the Act is 
administered and enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The failure of 
public companies to disclose illicit payments in filings required by the securities laws can 
lead to prosecution by SEC. The Senate Report that accompanied the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 in the US stressed the importance that corporation file periodically 
reports with the Commission.  
‘Corporate reports are regarded as the minimum which is the requisite for adequate 
protection of investors. The committee has repeatedly heard testimonies illustrating the 
evasion, suppression, distortions, exaggerations, and outright misrepresentation 
practices by corporations with the intent to cloak their operations and to present to the 
investing public a false or misleading appearance as to financial condition’.  (Quoting 
from, Vanasco, 1999, p. 199).   
 
The report made it clear that SEC may order the disclosure of questionable payments 
because stakeholders have a right to be fully advised of facts concerning the character 
and integrity of officials relevant to their management of the corporation.  
 
Individuals who commit wilful violations of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions may be 
punished by up to $250,000 in fines and/or five years imprisonment. Individuals who 
violate the FCPA accounting provisions may be fined up to $5,000,000 and imprisoned 
up to 20 years. Corporations may be fined up to $2,500,000 per violation of the FCPA 
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accounting provisions and $2,000,000 for violation of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions. 
Moreover, under the Alternative Fines Act, these fines can be much higher: the actual 
fine may be up to twice the loss to the victim or benefit the defendant did or sought to 
obtain by making the corrupt payment. Fines imposed on individuals may not be paid by 
their employer or principal. An unlawful payment under the FCPA is not deductible 
under the tax laws as a business expense.  
 
The FCPA also allows a civil penalty of up to $10,000 against any firm that violates the 
antibribery provisions of the FCPA, and against any officer, director, employee, or agent 
of a firm who wilfully violates the anti-bribery provisions of the Act. The 1998 
amendments eliminated a disparity in penalties between U.S. nationals who are 
employees or agents of issuers or domestic concerns and foreign nationals who are 
employees or agents of issuers or domestic concerns. While the Department of Justice has 
exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute criminal violations of the FCPA, both the Justice 
Department and the SEC may obtain injunctive relief to prevent bribery and 
recordkeeping violations of the FCPA. 
 
It has been argued that despite the increased severity of the penalties adopted in FCPA 
1977 and the Omnibus Trade and competitiveness Act 1988, US corporations do not 
seem deterred from bribing foreign officials to secure or maintain contracts overseas (see 
Vanasco, 1999). In the following section, some episodes of bribery and corrupt practices 
in developing countries are considered in order to show how MNCs and their corporate 
executives have exploited accounting practices for the purpose of furthering their 
financial interest.  
 
4.1 Methods 
This paper does not rely on a statistical sample in any positivistic sense because 
companies and individuals rarely provide information about their unethical and criminal 
corrupt practices and therefore the size of the populations cannot be determined in any 
meaningful way. Bribery and corruption are generally pursued away from the glare of 
public scrutiny and company financial reports are mostly silent on the issues. Rather it 
uses cases to illustrate the gap between conventional accounting and unaccountable or 
creative accounting to problematise the claim of corporate accountability. 
 
Our analysis is based on an examination of the material produced by US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (US SEC) and US Department of Justice (DOJ) charged with the 
investigations of the United States Multinational Companies (MNCs) involvement in 
bribery and corruption in developing countries and the court charges. US DOJ and SEC 
conducted public hearings and testimonies were provided by auditors, accountants, 
managers and employees. The US DOJ and SEC also had access to a ‘vast quantity of 
documentary evidence’ which included: memos, emails, internal circulars, contract 
agreements, audit reports, meeting minutes and government publications. The SEC and 
DOJ report were of particular interest as these provided a way to follow the flow of bribe 
payment through a ‘complex web of financial transaction and schemes aimed at leaving 
any trace in the official records. It also revealed the role accounting played in facilitating 
illegitimate flows.  
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The SEC and DOJ generated a huge volume of documents and transcripts amounting to 
some hundred pages. These reports were available electronically and we specifically 
reviewed these reports for accounting-related information. It was from this set of 
publicly-available documentary evidence, as well as other secondary information that we 
were able to trace the illegal flow of funds and the recording of irregular accounting 
practices. It relies on episodes that have been brought to public attention by regulators, all 
of which are ascribed a certain kind of hardness by contemporary standards of evidence. 
 
5. Some Case Studies 
The SEC and DOJ prosecuted several companies for violation of the accounting 
provisions of the FCPA and for falsifying the accounting records as attested by the 
following cases. 
 
5.1 Case 1 – Willbros International 
Willbros Group conducted its operations outside of North America through its wholly-
owned subsidiary, Willbros International, Inc. Willbros International is incorporated in 
Panama and maintained its administrative headquarters in Tulsa until 2000, when it 
moved to Houston. Until it sold its Nigerian assets in February 2007, the company had 
conducted business in Nigeria for over 40 years -primarily through three affiliates4. 
Before the sale of Nigerian assets in 2007, the company’s operations in Nigeria 
frequently represented a sizable percentage of the company’s global revenues. In 2004, 
for example, the Nigerian operations produced roughly 25% of the company’s global 
revenue. Willbros Group also conducted business in Ecuador through a subsidiary of 
Willbros International, known as Willbros Servicios Obras y Sistemas S .A. (‘Willbros 
Ecuador’). In 2004, the company, through Willbros Ecuador, undertook a project called 
the Proyecto Santo Domingo5. In addition, it conducted business in Bolivia through a 
subsidiary of Willbros International, known as Willbros Transandina. In late 2001, the 
company, through Willbros Transandina’s participation in a joint venture, obtained a $59 
million contract with a foreign consortium to construct a pipeline in Bolivia (the 
‘Yacuiba-Rio Grande project’) (see Figure 1 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4Willbros West Africa, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Willbros International; Willbros Nigeria Ltd., a 
majority-owned subsidiary of Willbros West Africa; and Willbros Offshore Nigeria Inc., a majority-owned 
subsidiary of Willbros West Africa (SEC v. Willbros Group, Inc., et al. (2008), p. 5).  
5 The client on this project was PetroComercial, a subsidiary of PetroEcuador. PetroEcuador is Ecuador's 
state-owned oil and gas company (SEC v. Willbros Group, Inc., et al. (2008), p. 5). 
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Figure 1 Willbros Subsidiary Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Extracted from SEC v. Willbros Group, Inc., et al. (2008) 
 
5.1.1 Willbros Bribery Scheme in Nigeria 
From at least 2003 through early 2005, Willbros Group, through acts taken by various 
employees and officers of certain of its affiliates, violated the FCPA by authorising 
bribery schemes to make corrupt payments to foreign officials in Nigeria to assist in 
obtaining and retaining business for Willbros Group and its subsidiaries. The scheme 
entailed authorising the payment of over $6 million in bribes to various officials to obtain 
at least two significant contracts. From these two contracts, Willbros Group realised 
approximately $8.9 million in net profits (US District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas, 2008). The court judgement sheet states that: 
‘In 2003, during the EGGS project bidding process, the Former President of Willbros 
International and Steph, acting on behalf of Willbros Group, plotted with certain 
employees of Willbros West Africa’s joint venture partner in the Willbros Nigerian 
Consortium, to make more than $6 million in payments to Nigerian officials, a Nigerian 
political party and an official in the executive branch of Nigeria's federal government. 
These payments were intended to help the WilIbros Nigeria Consortium obtain some or 
all of the EGGS business’. (US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2008, p. 
7).  
 
Therefore, to implement the scheme, the former President of Willbros International 
caused Willbros West Africa to enter into sham ‘consultancy agreements’6 with an 
outside consultant in Nigeria (‘Consultant 1’), whose company invoiced Willbros West 
Africa for purported ‘consulting’ services. The invoices were submitted by Jansen and 
others to the company’s administrative office in Houston for payment by wire transfer to 
 
6 The ‘consultancy agreements’ called for the payment, in exchange for purportedly legitimate consulting 
services, of 3% of the contract revenue for certain projects, including the EGGS project (US District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas, 2008). 
 Willbross International 
Nigeria Ecuador Bolivia 
Willbros West Africa Inc. 
Willbros Nigeria Ltd. 
Willbros Offshore Nig. Inc. 
Willbross Servicios Obrasy 
Sistemas S. A. (“Willbros 
Ecuador”) 
Willbros Transandina 
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a foreign bank, as directed by the invoices. To further conceal the unethical financial 
practices, the court judgement noted that: 
‘The wired money was purportedly for the legitimate consulting services provided to 
Willbros affiliates, but, in fact, some or all of that money was intended for corrupt 
payments.... The money disbursed to the ‘consultant 1’ was improperly recorded in 
Willbros Group’s books and records as legitimate consulting expenses or other business 
expenses. Through this scheme, a portion of these so-called “commitments” had been 
paid by late 2004’. (US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2008, p. 8.)  
  
In 2005, the company’s audit committee commenced an internal investigation into 
allegations of tax improprieties concerning Willbros Transandina, a subsidiary operating 
in Bolivia under the management of the Former President of Willbros International. The 
internal investigation was extended in scope to include activities in Nigeria. As a result of 
the company’s internal investigation, the ‘consulting’ agreements with Consultant 1’s 
companies were terminated and further payments to Consultant 1 ceased. Yet, Brown and 
Steph, in concert with employees of their joint venture partner, met with a Nigerian 
consultant (‘Consultant 2’) and determined to resume the payments. It was reported that, 
Brown and Steph agreed to pay $1,850,000 toward the outstanding ‘commitments’. 
Because they could no longer generate money by submitting invoices from Consultant l’s 
companies, Steph and others engaged in the scheme sought alternative sources (US 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2008). The judgement sheet stated that:  
‘They agreed on several potential funding sources: (1) a loan from principals of a 
Nigerian oil and gas company (‘Company 1’) to one of Willbros’s Nigerian subsidiaries; 
(2) a loan from the company’s Willbros Nigeria Consortium partner to one of Willbros’s 
Nigerian subsidiaries; and (3) petty cash from a local account maintained by one of 
Willbros’s Nigerian subsidiaries’.  (US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 
2008, p. 9.) 
 
Shortly thereafter, Brown, on behalf of Willbros West Africa, agreed to borrow, pursuant 
to a written loan agreement, $1 million from the company’s partner in the Willbros 
Nigeria Consortium. He then ‘loaned’ the money to Consultant 2, for delivery to Nigerian 
officials. Steph participated in the plan to fund the “commitments” and knew of Brown's 
actions. To further help procure the $1,850,000, Steph borrowed, in Nigerian currency, 
the equivalent of roughly $500,000 from another individual, working through a Nigerian 
oil and gas company. He then delivered that money to Consultant 2 to be transferred to 
Nigerian officials (US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2008).  
 
In addition, Steph directed that the equivalent of approximately $350,000 be procured 
from a Willbros cash account in Nigeria; Steph requested this money to transfer it to 
Consultant 2 for delivery to Nigerian officials. This money was accumulated using 
fictitious invoices to falsely inflate weekly funding requests transmitted to Willbros 
Group’s Houston administrative headquarters. After obtaining the $350,000, Steph 
transferred it to Consultant 2 for delivery to the Nigerian officials (US District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas, 2008).  
 
In order to reduce this tax obligation, employees of Willbros affiliates bribed auditors 
responsible for determining the amount of tax owed. In addition, Willbros International 
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employees in Nigeria also paid clerks and other officials within the Nigerian judicial 
system in exchange for favourable treatment in pending cases. The Court judgement 
sheet states that: 
‘These payments to court and tax officials were disguised within the company’s petty 
cash processes in Nigeria. Certain employees of Willbros Group’s subsidiaries 
requisitioned excess petty cash funds by submitting fictitious invoices from non-existent 
vendors. For example, Jansen and Biggers inflated the cash needed by obtaining 
fictitious invoices, typically for fuel, freight or catering expenses, from non-existent 
vendors. Jansen used these fictitious invoices to inflate the anticipated expenditures that 
he projected in weekly forecasts that he prepared or that were created under his 
direction’. (US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2008, p. 11.)   
 
These artificially inflated reports were used to obtain cash (ultimately over $6 million) 
from the company’s offices in Houston. At least $300,000 of this money was used to 
make payments to Nigerian tax and court officials. The Former President of Willbros 
International knew of these schemes and approved them, either explicitly or implicitly. 
The trace of the flow of the funds, revealed the role accounting played in facilitating the 
corrupt payment. The Court judgement stated that company executives knowingly 
facilitate corrupt payment: 
‘As part of this scheme, Jansen routinely approved for payment invoices he knew were 
false. He also knowingly submitted false cash requests and forecasts, knowing that those 
false reports would generate fund that would at least in part by used to bribe Nigerian 
court and tax officials. Biggers knowingly procured invoices he knew to be false and that 
he knew would be used to procure funds that would be used to bribe Nigerian court and 
tax officials. Finally, Steph knew about this conduct and approved it, both tacitly and on 
some occasions explicitly’. (US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2008, p. 
12.)   
 
From at least the early 1990’s through 2005, employees of Willbros Group or its affiliates 
in Nigeria abused petty cash accounts to, among other things, make repeated bribes to 
Nigerian tax and court officials. The court judgement and allegation of bribery payment 
also raise questions about the efficiency of internal control systems and auditing process 
(US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2008).  
 
5.1.2 Willbros Bribery Scheme in Ecuador 
In Ecuador, the Former President of Willbros International orchestrated, in violation of 
the FCPA, a promise to pay $300,000 in bribes to officials of PetroEcuador, an oil and 
gas company wholly-owned by the government of Ecuador, and its subsidiary, 
PetroComercial. The bribes were made to influence the awarding of a contract that 
ultimately generated total revenues exceeding $3 million. The Court indictment sheet 
states that:  
‘The Ecuador employee telephoned Brown and informed him that the company could 
obtain a $3 million contract to modify a pipeline running from Santo Domingo to El 
Beaterio, Ecuador (‘the Santa Domingo Project’), if the company would agree to pay 
$300,000 (10% of the contract value) to certain officials of PetroEcuador, an oil-and-gas 
company wholly-owned by the government of Ecuador, and its subsidiary, 
PetroComercial (collectively, ‘PetroEcuador’), and the sum were to be made in two 
equal instalments’. (US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2008, p. 12).. 
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With approval from the Former President of Willbros International, Brown and the 
Ecuador employee agreed to make, on behalf of Willbros Group and its affiliates, the 
payments. It was reported that between the January and June 2004 time period, the 
Former President of Willbros International, on the company’s behalf, communicated by 
e-mail and telephone with Brown to arrange the transfer of $150,000 to employees of 
Willbros Ecuador so that they could deliver the money to PetroEcuador officials. One or 
more of these e-mail communications were sent from Brown in South America through 
Willbros Group’s server located in Houston, Texas. In June 2004, the Former President 
of Willbros International directed an outside consultant to wire $150,000 to the bank 
account of a second Willbros Ecuador employee, so that the money could be then be used 
to make the payments to the PetroEcuador officials (US District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas, 2008). The Court indictment states that the payments were concealed in 
the book of Willbros: 
‘The money for these payments was transferred to the private bank accounts of Willbros 
Ecuador employees and their family members. These disbursements were falsely 
recorded in the company's books and records as ‘consulting expenses’, ‘platform 
expenses’, or as ‘prepaid expenses’. (US District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas, 2008, pp. 13-14. )  
 
The company ultimately performed the Santa Domingo project, and made roughly $3.4 
million in revenue. When the bribes pertaining to the second project were discovered in 
2005, the company relinquished the project. 
  
5.1.3 Willbros Bribery Scheme in Bolivia 
Willbros conducted business in Bolivia through Willbros Transandina, S.A., a subsidiary 
of Willbros International. In late 2001, Willbros Transandina, as part of a joint venture, 
was awarded a contract to complete a pipeline in Bolivia. Willbros Group, through the 
actions of others, including the former President of Willbros International and a United 
States citizen serving as an outside consultant (the ‘outside consultant’), devised and 
implemented a scheme to minimize Willbros Transandina’s VAT obligation by using 
fabricated invoices to Bolivian vendors as ‘offsets’. This was accomplished by acquiring 
invoices that reflected fictitious transactions; these invoices were then used to support tax 
returns that fraudulently claimed unearned VAT tax offsets (US District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas, 2008). The court indictment sheet states that: 
‘In many cases, the outside consultant procured the fictitious invoices. Galvez, as the in-
country accountant and administrator for Willbros Transandina, acting under the 
direction of the Former President of Willbros International, used the fictitious invoices to 
further the scheme by, among other things, preparing false returns and related records’. 
(US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2008, p. 15.)     
  
It was reported that rather than funding consulting services, however, these funds were 
spent, at least in part, to procure the fictitious invoices and to otherwise support the 
fraudulent tax minimization strategy. In 2004 alone, Willbros Group paid more than 
$500,000 to the outside consultant. As a result of this scheme, the contract costs and the 
VAT liabilities to the Bolivian government for fiscal years 2002, 2003 and 2004 were 
materially understated; the scheme effectively inflated Willbros Group’s net income by 
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approximately 6.4% in fiscal year 2003 and inflated earnings per share by approximately 
$.03 for both fiscal year 2003 and the first three quarters of 2004. 
 
In addition to VAT, the Bolivian government levies an income tax on foreign companies 
doing business in Bolivia through a 12.5 per cent withholding tax (‘Foreign Withholding 
Tax’). Willbros Group, primarily through conduct by the Former President of Willbros 
International, materially understated its Foreign Withholding Tax liabilities during the fiscal 
years 2002, 2003, and 2004. During these periods, the Former President of Willbros 
International, accounting personnel eliminated the Foreign Withholding Tax liabilities from 
Willbros Group’s books and records, by reducing the tax liability account to offset cash 
disbursements made to the outside consultant and others. In reality, there was no legitimate 
tax saving strategy. Instead the funds were merely used to benefit the purported outside 
consultant and others. These actions and the resulting false records caused the tax liability to 
be understated. As a result, for fiscal year 2003, these understatements caused Willbros 
Group’s net income to be inflated by approximately 6.4 per cent. This scheme resulted in 
material misstatements in the financial statements which Willbros Group included within 
certain Commission filings7.  
 
As a consequence, the Willbros Group and its subsidiary, Willbros International Inc., 
accepted responsibility for its employees who had violated the FCPA 1977 and agreed to 
pay $22 million by way of fines in connection with the corrupt payment to the Nigerian, 
Ecuadoran and Bolivian Government Officials (US SEC Litigation Release, 14 May 
2008; US Department of Justice Release, 14 May 2008). This case also illustrates the use 
of bribery to secure competitive advantages, and increased profits. While the larger bribes 
were used for securing government contracts, others were used to obtain a reduced tax 
liability in Nigeria, Ecuador and Bolivia, and to secure favourable treatment in pending 
cases in Nigeria. The Court transcript revealed that Willbros used shell companies in the 
form of consultancy firms and agents with no actual business with the company other 
than to distribute the bribe to the beneficiaries. These predatory practices are disguised in 
the companies’ accounts through the use of fictitious accounting transactions. The 
following case explores another bribery scandal involving a US company in sale of goods 
to the United Nations. 
 
5.2 Case 2 – Armor Holdings, Inc. and U.N. Bribery Scheme  
Armor Holdings, Inc., during the relevant period, was a Delaware corporation, headquartered 
in Jacksonville, Florida, whose operating subsidiaries specialised in the manufacture and sale 
of military, law enforcement, and personnel safety equipment.  Armor Holdings Products, 
LLC (‘AHP’), is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Armor Holdings, and a Delaware limited 
liability company with headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida. While Armor Products 
International, Ltd. (‘API’), is a wholly-owned UK subsidiary of AHP. API’s financial 
results were consolidated into AHP’s financial statements which, in turn, were 
consolidated within the financial statements of Armor Holdings (US District Court for 
the District of Columbia, 2011).   
 
 
7 This material misrepresentations violates Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) 
and Section 10a of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, along with the books and records, internal 
controls and reporting provisions of the Exchange Act. 
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The agents of Armor Holdings8 caused API to enter into a sham consulting agreement 
with a third-party intermediary for purportedly legitimate services in connection with the 
sale of goods to the U.N. API agreed to pay the intermediary a success fee in the form of 
a percentage of value of any contract obtained from the U.N. The SEC complaint reports 
that: 
‘From 2001 through 2006, certain agents of Armor Holdings participated in a bribery 
scheme in which corrupt payments were authorized to be made to an official of the 
United Nations (‘U.N.’), for the purpose of obtaining and retaining U.N. business’. (US 
District Court for the District of Columbia, 2011, p. 1).  
 
Furthermore, it was also reported that from 2001 through June 2007, another Armor 
Holdings subsidiary employed an accounting practice that disguised in its books and 
records approximately $4,371,278 in commissions paid to intermediaries who brokered 
the sale of goods to foreign governments. The SEC complaint states that: 
‘Between 2001 and 2006, API received various invoices from the third-party 
intermediary. The intermediary charged API inflated or illegitimate commissions for its 
purported consulting services – reaching as high as twenty percent of the amount to be 
earned on the original contract’. (US District Court for the District of Columbia, 2011, p. 
3.) 
 
 
Agents of Armor Holdings knew or consciously disregarded that some portion of these 
commissions would be offered to a U.N. official. In late September 2001, the third-party 
intermediary obtained a confidential internal U.N. memorandum recommending that API 
be awarded the contract. It was noted in the SEC complaint that: 
‘In October 2001, the U.N. awarded API a multi-year contract for the supply of body 
armor. API’s ability to secure this business was facilitated by the intermediary's inside 
access within the U.N. procurement system’. (US District Court for the District of 
Columbia, 2011, p. 4.) 
In February 2003, an AHP vice president asked the third-party intermediary how API 
could win a renewal contract to -sell body armor to the U.N. The intermediary responded 
that the same rules would apply to the 2003 tender as applied to the 2001 tender. In 
August 2003, API received another three-year contract from the U.N. In 2006, API 
received an additional one-year supply extension from the U.N., without further 
assistance from the third-party intermediary. Such an extension was contemplated by the 
2003 contract. It was therefore reported that: 
‘By late 2006, API had made at least ninety-two payments to the U.N. intermediary, 
totaling approximately $222,750. Agents of Armor Holdings caused API to wire 
payments to the intermediary with the understanding that part of these payments would 
be offered to a U.N. official who could help steer business to API. From the 2001 and 
2003 U.N. body Armor contracts –together with the one-year extension granted in 2006 -
Armor Holdings derived gross revenues of approximately $7,121,237, and net profits of 
approximately $1,552,306’. (US District Court for the District of Columbia, 2011, pp. 5-
6.)  
 
 
8 AHP vice president and an API senior officer, agents of Armor Holdings, participated in a scheme to help 
API obtain contracts for the supply of body armor to be used in U.N. peacekeeping missions. 
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The SEC complaint further notes that from in or around 2001 through June 2007, AHP 
also employed a separate accounting practice (hereinafter described as ‘distributor net’) 
to disguised in the books and records of Armor Holdings roughly $4,371,278 in sales 
commissions paid to third-party intermediaries who brokered the sale of goods to foreign 
governments.  
 
Since the sales intermediaries never obtained title over the goods, and AHP retained the 
risks and rewards of ownership prior to delivery, U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (‘GAAP’) required AHP to record sales to foreign governments at the full or 
‘gross’ sales price –with a separate display of any commission expense for amounts paid 
to an intermediary. In contracts to these general accounting principles, AHP adopted the 
‘distributor net’ accounting practice which disguised certain commission payments to 
sales intermediaries in the books and records of Armor Holdings. The SEC complaint 
specifically noted that:  
‘In a typical ‘distributor net’ transaction, AHP sent the foreign-government customer a 
‘gross’ invoice –including the sales price of goods sold, plus commission while internally 
recording sales at a ‘net’ amount that did not include the commission due to the third-
party sales intermediary. Thus, amounts received from the customer would be greater 
than the amount booked internally for a sale, resulting in a credit balance in the 
customer’s account receivable. AHP would then transfer the ‘overpayment’ through a 
series of non-commission accounts before ultimately disbursing it to the third-party sales 
intermediary’. (US District Court for the District of Columbia, 2011, p. 5.)  
 
Hence, these payments to sales intermediaries under ‘distributor net’ accounting were 
never recorded as a commission expense on the books and records of Armor Holdings.  
The largest ‘distributor net’ deal involved a sale of body armor vests to the Iraqi 
government. In this 2005 transaction, an Armor Holdings subsidiary submitted ‘gross’ 
invoices totaling $3,364,532 through an intermediary in the U.K. Rather than record the 
transaction at the ‘gross’ amount, AHP booked the sales and accounts receivable at the 
‘net’ amount of $2,220,000. AHP then recorded much of the $1,144,532 ‘overpayment’ 
in unrelated accounts before disbursing commissions to two sales intermediaries. The 
effect of ‘distributor net’ accounting for this transaction was to conceal over $1 million in 
commissions on the books and records of Armor Holdings. The use of ‘distributor net’ 
accounting system was actually condemned by the external auditor of Armor Holdings 
thus: 
‘Armor Holdings was on notice that AHP’s ‘distributor net’ accounting was improper. 
For example, on March 12, 2001, Armor Holdings’ outside auditor emailed comments to 
certain senior officers, indicating that the ‘distributor net’ practice understated accrued 
liabilities and accounts receivable; and that the company should record a receivable for 
the gross amount due, together with an accrual for commissions’. (p. 6.) 
  
In addition to the notice by the external auditor, one of the Armor Holdings subsidiary 
comptrollers also criticised the use and the application of ‘distributor net’ accounting 
system: 
‘On September 22, 2005, the comptroller of another Armor Holdings subsidiary who had 
refused to implement ‘distributor net’ at his division advised senior officials at AHP and 
Armor Holdings of his concern that such accounting was ‘blown out of the water’ by 
GAAP. Because AHP acted as a manufacturer rather than a distributor, the comptroller 
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believed ‘it would be wholly inappropriate, based on the guidance in EITF [Emerging 
Issues Task Force] 99-19 to record the revenues net’. (US District Court for the District 
of Columbia, 2011, p. 6.) 
  
SEC complaint states that despite the criticisms against the use of this accounting method 
that contradict the GAAP in the US, AHP continued to employ ‘distributor net’ 
accounting through June 2007. It was therefore reported that AHP used ‘distributor net’ 
accounting in at least 92 transactions from 2001 through June 2007 –resulting in 
approximately $4,371,278 of undisclosed commissions on the books and records of 
Armor Holdings, and rendering those books and records inaccurate (US District Court for 
the District of Columbia, 2011). 
 
As a consequence, Armor Holdings, was indicted and charged for failure to ensure 
effective internal controls system and the application of ‘distributor net’ method of 
accounting for illegal commission paid to third parties in the scheme. The SEC therefore 
filed a settled civil enforcement action against Armor Holdings, Inc., alleging violations 
of anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of FCPA. Armor 
Holdings, latter reached a settlement with the US SEC and agreed to pay a total of 
$5,690,744 in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties in order to resolve 
the commission’s charges (SEC Litigation Release, 13 July 2011). In a related matter, 
Armor Holdings entered into an agreement with DOJ to pay a $10,290,000 penalty to the 
US Department of Justice to resolve violations of the FCPA (Department of Justice, 13 
July 2011). 
 
5.3 Case 3 – Johnson and Johnson (J & J) 
Johnson & Johnson (‘J&J’) is a global pharmaceutical, consumer product, and medical 
device company headquartered in New Brunswick, NJ. Its securities are registered with 
the Commission under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act, and its common stock trades 
on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol ‘JNJ’. J&J operates worldwide 
through more than 250 operating companies. J&J and its subsidiaries employ more than 
100,000 people. In fiscal year 2009, its sales totalled $61.8 billion (United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, 2011). 
 
J&J through its seven subsidiaries9 were alleged to have violated the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and the FCPA of 1977 by making illicit payments to foreign government 
officials in order to obtain or retain business in four different countries (Greece, Poland, 
Romania and Iraqi) (see Figure 2 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 These subsidiaries were located in Delaware, Britain, Greece, Poland, Romania, Switzerland and 
Belgium. 
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Figure 2 Johnson and Johnson Subsidiary Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Extracted from SEC v. Johnson and Johnson (2011) 
 
5.3.1 Bribery Scheme in Greece 
One of the J&J’s product lines is surgical implants10 such as artificial knees, hips and 
other products that surgeons implant into patients. In 1998, J&J acquired another medical 
device company, DePuy Inc., a NYSE company. It was reported that at the time of 
acquisition, DePuy was engaged in widespread bribery scheme in Greece to sell its 
implants. Executive A11 and DPI executives knowingly continued that scheme. From 
1998 to 2006, J&J earned $24,258,072 in profits on sales obtained through bribery 
(United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 2011). According to the SEC 
complaint, DPI executed two contracts to memorialise the deal: 
‘In September 1997, DPI hired the Greek Agent’s, Greek company (the Greek 
Distributor) as its exclusive sales agent. Under that deal, the Greek Distributor agreed to 
market DePuy products in Greece and to pay DPI for products that it re-sold primarily to 
 
10 Surgical implants are a lucrative business. In many countries, orthopaedic surgeons control which 
implants they used (p. 4). 
11 Executive A, is a top DePuy executive who went to become a top J&J executive in the United States in 
J&J medical device and diagnostics business. 
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public hospitals. A month later, DPI signed a separate contract with a private company 
in the Isle of Man (the private company) owned by the Greek Agent in which DPI agreed 
to pay the private company a 25 per cent commission on everything that the Greek 
Distributor purchased.....the second contract states that the private company would 
provide marketing support to the Greek Distributor and DPI’, (p. 5). 
 
The SEC complaint states that the contacts were a sham engineered to facilitate bribery. 
DPI inflated the price it charged the Greek Distributor, then paid that ‘commission’ to the 
private company. The private company did not provide any significant services to DPI. 
The Greek Agent used the commissions which were raised to 35 per cent by 1988 – to 
bribe publicly employed doctors to use DePuy implants (United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia, 2011). 
 
After the merger, J&J executives learned that the Greek Agent was being paid through a 
private company in the Isle of Man. These payments violated the PBC’s policy requiring 
all agent payments be made in the country where the product was sold, i.e., in Greece. 
DPI executive were particularly concerned that the payments made out of country would 
raised red flags of bribery. As a consequence, by April 1999, it was reported that certain 
J&J executives decided to stop the payments to the Private Company in the Isle of Man 
over the objection of Executive A (United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, 2011). Contrary to the above decision, Executive A notes that terminating the 
Greek Distributor would affect their performance: 
‘[t]he only problem with the proposal was that we would lose half our business even by 
year 3’ Executive A stated that [t]o lose approximately $4 million in sales in end user 
terms to the competition is totally unacceptable’. (p. 7) 
 
The DPI executives then met with the Greek Agent to discuss their future business 
arrangements. It was reported that Executive A tried to reinstitute the payments in the Isle 
of Man, but after a J&J attorney objected, Executive A allowed DPI to acquire the Greek 
Distributor instead. The negotiation towards buying the Greek Distributor raised more red 
flags of bribery, yet DPI lawyer and accountant draft of due diligence report states that 
they had not seen evidence of bribery in the Greek Distributor books and could not 
determine whether the Greek Distributor engaged in these practices. However, the Greek 
Distributor’s outside accountant e-mailed the DPI financial executive stating that: 
‘The Greek Distributor’s inventory was overvalued by 35 per cent and would have to be 
adjusted after DPI’s acquisition when the inventory was valued and rolled up to J&J’s 
books and records’. (p. 7.) 
   
The e-mail noted that the Greek distributor had paid inflated prices to fund the payments 
to the Private Company and to cover ‘cash incentives that the Greek Agent paid. The e-
mail alerted the DPI accountant to the bribery, but he never changed his due diligence 
report (United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 2011). It was further 
reported that several DPI executives knew that ‘cash incentives’ were not proper and that 
they were really bribes to doctors. To further conceal the illicit payments, J&J finally 
closed DPI’s acquisition of the Greek Distributor in January 2001 and renamed it DePuy 
Helles. The Greek Agent’s associate became the head of DePuy Helles. The report states 
that rather than sever its ties to the Greek Agent, DePuy Helles continue to use him as 
consultant to facilitate bribe payments: 
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‘To conceal the true purpose and amount of payments subsequently made to Greek Agent, 
the DPI executives split the payments between two new agreements with some payments 
paid by DPI and others paid by DePuy Helles. The bribe payments to doctors continued, 
and the Greek Agent and DPI executives often referred to them as ‘professional 
education’ and ‘support’. (p. 9)   
 
In October 2003, DPI dismissed the Greek Agent after months of disputes about the sales 
of surgical implants in Greece. As a result, DPI hired another agent to fill the same role in 
the bribery scheme. In 2005, considering the effect of a new EUCOMED Code of 
Business Practice, DPI vice president wrote to the head of DePuy Helles and his 
supervisor: 
‘Everyone in the industry is a million miles from applying the letter or sprit of the 
EUCOMED code! Most industry players break every single rule in the book (support 
spouse travel, given non-medical gifts, etc.). If we applied the letter and intent of the 
guidelines today, we would lose 95 per cent of our business by the end of the year’. (p. 
10). 
 
It was therefore reported that from 2002 to 2006, records show about $590,000 in large, 
round-number withdrawals booked as ‘miscellaneous’. Those amounts were generally re-
deposited to a petty cash within days and were booked as ‘prepayments’ (p. 10). The 
J&J’s internal audit group discovered the payments to Greek doctors in early 2006 after 
receiving a whistleblower complaint (United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, 2011). 
  
5.3.2 Bribery Scheme in Poland 
The SEC complaint noted that the employee of MD&D Poland, and J&J subsidiary, 
through sham contracts, travel documents and slush funds bribed publicly-employed 
doctors and hospital administrators to obtain business. From 2002 to 2006, J&J earned 
$4,348,000 in profits from its sales through the bribery. It was reported that MD&D 
Poland created a sham civil contract publicly-employed doctors and hospital 
administrators:  
‘To pay them for using J&J’s medical devices or for influencing hospitals to award 
medical device to MD&D Poland. Although the contracts called for services, the doctors 
would not provide any, and MD&D Poland would pay the doctors based on fictitious 
activities’. (p. 11). 
 
Approximately, between 2002 and 2006, $775,000 of improper civil contract payments 
were funnelled to public doctors. It was noted in the report that, MD&D Poland had no 
internal controls in place that would have required supporting documentation be provided 
prior to making the payment to the doctors. In addition, MD&D Poland employees also 
faked travel expenses in order to generate cash. The money was then funnelled to doctors 
as bribe payments. For example, two MD&D franchises used a particular travel agency to 
funnel money to a senior Poland Ministry of Health official with significant influence 
over a hospital. MD&D Poland was reported to have spent approximately $7.7 million on 
these travel sponsorship between 2000 and 2006 that were rolled into the books of J&J 
with an indeterminate amount as bribes due to insufficient records (United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, 2011).  
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5.3.3 Bribery Scheme in Romania 
The SEC complaint reports that employees of J&J d.o.o. (‘Pharma Romania’), a J&J 
subsidiary, bribed publicly-employed doctors and pharmacists to prescribe and ordered 
J&J products for their patients. From 2000 to 2007, J&J earned $3,515,500 in profit from 
its sales through the bribe (United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
2011). According to the SEC Complaint: 
‘Pharma Romania employees or the distributors would then deliver the cash to the 
doctors that were equal to 3-5 per cent of the cost of the drugs that they prescribed. The 
distributors would then work with the doctors and pharmacies to deliver the drugs to 
patients and receive payment for the drugs from Romanian government insurance 
program’. (p. 13). 
  
Due to J&J’s internal audit on claims of cash payments to doctor, Pharma Romania 
introduced another scheme by offering the doctors trips to medical congresses in return 
for the doctors prescribing promotional products. It was noted that in some cases, Pharma 
Romania employees and J&J’s travel agents overcharged Pharma Romania for trips in 
order to generate cash to pay for the doctors’ family to attend the trips as vacations or to 
provide the doctors with ‘pocket money’ while on the trips (United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia, 2011). 
 
5.3.4 Bribery Scheme in Iraq 
 The Oil for Food Program12 (the ‘Program’) was intended to provide humanitarian relief 
for the Iraqi population, which faced severe hardship under the international trade 
sanctions that followed Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The program permitted the Iraqi 
government to sell its crude oil and use the proceeds to purchase food, medicine, and 
critical infrastructure supplies (United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
2011).  
 
It was reported that corruption was rampant within the program. By mid-2000, Iraqi 
ministries on the instruction of top government officials instituted a policy requiring 
suppliers of humanitarian goods to pay a ten per cent kickback on each contract. This 
kickback requirement was euphemistically referred to as an ‘after-sales service’ fee, 
however, no services were provided. Suppliers competing to obtain contracts under the 
program were encouraged to include a ten per cent mark-up in their bids or purchase 
orders. The inflated contract prices were incorporated into the Oil for Food contracts as a 
way to permit the suppliers to recover from the U. N. Escrow Account the kickback 
payments they had paid secretly to Iraq13 (United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, 2011). 
 
 
12 The proceeds of the oil sales were transferred directly from the buyers to an escrow account (the ‘U.N. 
Escrow Account’) maintained in New York by the United Nations 661 Committee. Funds in the U.N. 
Escrow Account were available for the purchase of humanitarian supplies, subject to U. N. approval and 
supervision (p. 14). 
13 Following the 2004 release of a report by the U.S. General Accounting Office exposing some of the 
abuses, estimated that the Iraqi government had diverted $1.7 billion in illicit income from the program 
(United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 2011, p. 15) 
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J&J participated in the Program through two of its subsidiaries, Cilag AG International 
and Janssen Pharmaceutica N. V. (collectively ‘Janssen-Cilag’). It was reported that 
during the Program, Janssen-Cilag sold pharmaceuticals to an arm of the Iraqi Ministry of 
Health Known as Kimadia. Janssen-Cilag conducted business with kimadia through a 
Lebanese agent. The Agent’s primary contact with J&J companies was an area director at 
Janssen-Cilag’s office in Lebanon. In February 2001, several months after Kimadia 
started demanding kickbacks, Janssen-Colag signed ‘side letters with the Agent that 
raised his commissions on sales in Iraq by ten per cent to twenty-two per cent. The report 
notes that: 
‘The increase in the Agent’s commission was approved by a Janssen-Cilag area director 
in Lebanon as well as managing director for Janssen-Cilag’s Middle East West Asia 
(MEWA) group in Belgium. The reason for the increase was so that the Agent could 
conduct ‘promotional activities’ in Iraq..... on behalf of Janssen-Cilag to pay the 
required ten per cent kickbacks to the Iraqi ministries through the agent and to mask the 
payments as legitimate agent commission in the companies’ books and records’. (p. 16). 
 
In total, secret kickback payments of approximately $857,387 were made in connections 
with nineteen Oil for Food contracts. The payments were made through the Agent to Iraqi 
controlled accounts in order to avoid detection by the U. N. The fee was effectively a 
bribe paid to the Iraqi regime, which were disguised on J&J’s books and recorded by 
mischaracterising the bribe as legitimate commissions (United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia, 2011). In order to generate funds to pay the bribe and to conceal 
these payments: 
‘Janssen-Cilag and its agent inflated the price of the contracts by at least ten per cent 
before submitting them to the U. N. for approval. J&J’s total profits on the contract were 
$6,106,255’ (p. 17).  
 
J&J through its subsidiaries and agents were accused of knowingly allowed its employees 
and third parties to pay Greek and Polish public doctors and public hospital 
administrators and the Iraqi government ministries for the purpose of obtaining or 
retaining business. In addition, Polish doctors were bribed to use J&J products in return 
for trips. Use of the mails and interstate commerce was also used to facilitate the bribery 
schemes in Greece and Poland. J&J’s subsidiaries made numerous illicit payments for the 
purpose of obtaining contract in Iraq, Romania, Greece and Poland. The SEC report notes 
that: 
‘J&J’s books and records did not reflect the true nature of those payments. Certain J&J 
subsidiaries created false contracts, invoices, and other documents to conceal the true 
business arrangement it had with its consultants and distributors to bribes. False 
documents were created, and petty cash was used to pay bribes. United Nations contracts 
were also falsified’. (p. 18). 
 
J&J also failed to implement adequate internal controls to detect or prevent bribery. The 
conduct was widespread in various markets, Greece, Poland, Romania and Iraq. The 
conduct involved employees and managers of all levels, false documents were routinely 
created to conceal the bribery in each country (United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, 2011).  
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It was reported that rather than cease the bribery that was happening at DePuy prior to its 
acquisition, J&J through its subsidiaries, employees and agents allowed the bribery to 
continue. They created sham businesses and entered into contracts that were merely 
conduits to allow the bribery to flourish. They failed to conduct due diligence on the 
Greek distributor. MD&D Poland also entered into fake civil contracts with Polish 
doctors and J&J also created false travel arrangements in Poland and Romania to create 
slush funds. Cilag and Janssen paid bribe to Iraq despite the fact that trade sanctions were 
in place against doing business in Iraq. Cilag and Janssen falsified their contracts with the 
United Nations to conceal the kickbacks being paid to Iraq (United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia, 2011). As a consequence, SEC filed an action against 
Johnson and Johnson that it violates the FCPA by bribing public doctors in several 
European countries and paying kickbacks to Iraq to illegally obtained business. SEC 
alleges that:  
‘Since at least 1998, subsidiaries of the New Brunswick, N. J.- based pharmaceutical, 
consumer product, and medical device company paid bribes to public doctors in Greece 
who selected J&J surgical implants, public doctors and hospital administrators in 
Romania to prescribe J&J pharmaceutical products. J&J subsidiaries also paid 
kickbacks to Iraq to obtain 19 contracts under the United Nations Oil for Food program’. 
(United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 2011, pp. 19-20). 
 
As part of the settlement, J&J agreed to pay more than $48.6 million in disgorgement and 
prejudgment interest to settle the SEC’s charges and to pay a $21.4 million fine to the 
DOJ to settle criminal charges.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has sought to stimulate debates about the supply side of corrupt practices in 
developing countries to illuminate the role played by US Multinational companies. What 
we have presented here is just a sample of episode of what took place during the last 
decade. The evidence presented in this paper has shown that bribery undermines the main 
objective of promoting democratically accountable governments and professional civil 
services in developing countries and free enterprise system. In pursuit of higher financial 
rewards, promotions and status, such practices seems to be crafted and sanctioned by 
highly paid executives or dull the systemic pressure for higher profits and returns. 
 
Corruption has both the demand and supply aspects to it, and the action of the bribe-
payers are as important as those of bribe-takers in determining the level of corruption in 
developing countries (Otusanya, 2010, 2011a). As the evidence shows, the corporate 
sector often portrayed as the victim of corruption, is an important source of endemic 
corrupt practices in developing countries. The corruption and bribery practices are highly 
institutionalised as long a business executives are rewarded for increases in profits there 
may be economic incentives to engage in predatory behaviour. MNC do not seem to have 
been constrained by any notion of ethics or morality. Repeated fines and warning since 
the 1970s from regulators did not curb violations of rules (either regulatory or 
accounting), and anti-social behaviour by MNCs. Despite numerous commissions and 
inquiries, the ethics of business managers, improper accounting still occurred, and audit 
firms either could not or did not stop them or even report once discovered. It has been 
reported that in many cases western companies and western agents have been guilty of 
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offering and paying bribes to government officials to secure contracts and other 
advantages (AAPPG, 2006; Otusanya, 2010, 2011a).  While some accountant may be 
unwittingly caught up in antisocial financial practices, it is relevant to ask how much of 
this activity cannot easily take place without the active and passive involvement of 
company accountants. Compin (2008) noted that: 
‘By creating fake balance-sheet, fictitious entries, fraudulent and fictitious billing 
networks and ad hoc entities specifically for short-term assignments, accountants and 
legal advisers are able to resolve the dilemma of ownership rights so that instead of 
criminals being locked into illegal networks their seemingly healthy social structure 
allow them to fit into the logic of criminal globalisation’. (p. 596). 
 
These bribery cases only present the tip of an iceberg of FCPA violations committed by 
MNCs in the course of their worldwide operations. However, it raises some question 
about the nature of enterprise culture embraced by some MNCs. While complying with 
the relevant sections of FCPA 1977, MNCs may create a positive image for foreign 
investors, regulators and governments that they are doing something to improve the 
quality of financial information reporting, little has changed in actuality. The evidence 
also point to the potential and limitation of such accounting reform as anti-corruption 
strategy. Accounting reform measures, such as the internal control and books and records 
requirement of FCPA may have made some improvements on corporate accounting 
practices, their enforcement will not automatically bring down the level of bribery by 
MNCs in developing countries. Despite FCPA and other international initiatives aimed at 
curbing corruption around the world, level of corruption and bribery has increased and is 
estimated to be over $1 trillion each year (AAPPG, 2006, Baker, 2005). 
 
Evidence therefore shows that corporate hand in bribery and corrupt practices is 
sometime given visibility by regulators. The role of SEC has been consistent in protecting 
the best interest of all stakeholders. By suing several US corporations for questionable 
illicit payments, the SEC succeeded in sending a clear message to the corporate 
community that it intended to restore the efficiency of the system of corporate 
accountability. For example, the US drug manufacturer J&J admitted that some of its 
subsidiaries made improper payments in connection with sales of medical devices in a 
number of countries.  
 
Anti-social financial practices hinder economic development and reduce investment in 
infrastructures, institutions and social services, thereby forcing ordinary consumers to pay 
higher prices and degrading the quality of life of millions of citizens. Such practices also 
make public contracts more expensive as they increase the cost of doing business. As a 
consequence, investors are likely to be reluctant to invest in development projects in in 
developing countries. There is a high level of risk associated with such investment 
practices, as government revenues disappear into the pockets of corrupt public officials 
(as shown in the case studies above), while the poor are denied access to education, 
healthcare, clean water and a decent standard of living. To combat anti-social practices 
and corruption there is a need to educate company executives, policymakers and the 
public about the human costs of anti-social and corrupt financial as they deprive ordinary 
citizens of their human and social rights. 
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This study reported that bribery and corruption are widely perpetuated by foreign MNCs 
operating in developing countries. Moreover, the private sector is often at the centre of 
bribery and corrupt practices either as enablers or as victims disadvantaged by corruption. 
Although some have suggested that involving the private sector in the fight against anti-
social practices might be helpful, the difficulty is how to reconcile the systemic pressures 
to increase private profits with social welfare. To this end the developing states may 
review their Companies Act to compel a corporation to explain and publish in its 
financial reports that it has paid a bribe under a related party transaction. The accounting 
standards dealing with related party transactions may need to be strengthened (by 
compelling MNCs to disclose information about: which entities make up the MNCs; 
where those entities are located and what they do; what values of sales they make in each 
states amongst others) in order to promote greater transparency. However, as the 
standard-setters have been colonised by the local and global economic elite, they are 
likely to lobby against its inclusion in any reform agendas. 
 
This study has shown that anti-social practice is a global phenomenon which requires 
both local and global solutions. Although a number of international initiatives14 have 
been established to criminalise the bribery of public officials (to address the supply side 
of corruption) and to provide mutual legal assistance, considerable problems of 
compliance and enforcement by member states remain. Thus, there is a need to establish 
an international adjudication system, possibly within the United Nations, to enable 
developing countries to seek sanctions against non-compliant countries. This paper 
therefore argues that global co-operation under the umbrella and auspices of the United 
Nations should be encouraged. 
 
 
14  These includes; Federal Corrupt Practices Act 1977, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 1997; UN 
Convention Against Corruption 2005, and World Bank Anti-Corruption Strategies. 
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